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Abstract
We present an optimization framework for solving multi-agent nonlinear programs subject to in-
equality constraints while keeping the agents’ state trajectories private. Each agent has an objective
function depending only upon its own state and the agents are collectively subject to global constraints.
The agents do not directly communicate with each other but instead route messages through a trusted
cloud computer. The cloud computer adds noise to data being sent to the agents in accordance with the
framework of differential privacy in order to keep each agent’s state trajectory private from all other
agents and any eavesdroppers. This private problem can be viewed as a stochastic variational inequality
and is solved using a projection-based method for solving variational inequalities that resembles a noisy
primal-dual gradient algorithm. Convergence of the optimization algorithm in the presence of noise
is proven and a quantifiable trade-off between privacy and convergence is extracted from this proof.
Simulation results are provided that demonstrate numerical convergence for both -differential privacy
and (, δ)-differential privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Optimization problems spread across teams of agents arise naturally in several fields, including
communications [1], [2], robotics [3], [4], machine learning [5], sensor networks [6], [7], and
smart power grids [8], [9], [10]. Correspondingly, a variety of approaches have been developed
that solve problems with a wide variety of formulations. For example, [11] allows for distributed
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optimization of non-differentiable objectives with time-varying communication links, [12] con-
siders a similar problem formulation in which communication links fail over time, and [13] uses
a distributed Newton method to solve dynamic network utility maximization problems. Many
other problem types and solution schemes exist in the literature, and a broad exposition of results
can be found in [14].
In some cases multi-agent optimization is done using sensitive user data. A concrete example
of such a case comes from smart power grids. In smart power grids, homeowners share their
power usage information with others on the grid to allow network management (e.g., frequency
regulation [10]) and to minimize their own power costs. In some cases, the granular power usage
data shared in smart grids can be used to infer sensitive details of users’ personal lives [15],
[16]. In particular, smart grid data can “provide a detailed breakdown of energy usage over a
long period of time, which can show patterns of use,” [16, Page 15, Item 16]. Further, given
these patterns, “[p]rofiles can thus be developed and then applied back to individual households
and individual members of these households,” [16, Page 15, Item 18]. These usage patterns in
turn ”could reveal personal details about the lives of consumers, such as their daily schedules,”
[15, Page 2, Paragraph 5].
It is precisely the deduction of such patterns that we wish to prevent in the context of multi-
agent optimization. Based on the potentially revealing nature of some user data, we seek to
optimize while protecting sensitive user data both from eavesdroppers and other agents in the
network. In some sense, privacy and optimization are competing objectives in that agents who
only seek to optimize may freely share their states with others in the network, while agents
concerned only with privacy may be inclined to share no information at all. To privately optimize,
then, we must strike a balance between these two different, competing objectives.
One approach to privacy that has recently seen widespread use is differential privacy. Differ-
ential privacy was originally established in the database literature and keeps sensitive database
entries private when a database is queried by adding noise to the result of that query [17], [18].
The authors of [19], [20] survey some of the important developments in this vein. Differential
privacy has been adapted to dynamical systems in order to keep sensitive inputs private from
an adversary observing a system’s outputs [21]. A dynamical system is differentially private if
inputs that are close in the input space produce outputs that have similar probability distributions;
these notions will be made precise in Section III.
It is the dynamical systems notion of differential privacy that we apply to keep agents’ state
trajectories private while optimizing. One appealing aspect of differential privacy is its resilience
to post-processing, which allows for arbitrary processing of private information without the threat
of its privacy guarantees being weakened [21, Theorem 1]. Differential privacy is also robust
to arbitrary side information, meaning that an adversary cannot weaken differential privacy by
much through using information gleaned from another source [22].
There has already been some work on enforcing differential privacy in optimization. In
[23] linear programs are solved in a framework that allows for keeping objective functions
or constraints private. The authors of [24] consider a similar setting wherein linearly constrained
problems with affine objectives are solved while keeping the objective functions private. In the
multi-agent setting, [25] solves distributed consensus-type problems while keeping the agents’
objective functions private, while [26] solves similar problems while keeping each agent’s initial
state private.
In this paper we solve non-linear programs wherein each agent’s state trajectory is sensitive
information and the agents therefore seek to protect their exact state trajectories from other agents
and any eavesdroppers. To protect these sensitive data, a trusted cloud computer is used that
performs certain computations upon information it receives from the agents, makes the results
of those computations private by adding noise to them, and then sends the private results to each
agent. Each agent then updates its state locally using the information it received from the cloud,
and this process of sharing and updating information is repeated.
Our motivation for developing a mixed centralized/decentralized algorithm is inspired by the
prominence of cloud computing in many real-world applications. A survey of existing cloud
applications is given in [27], and that reference elaborates on the scalability of the cloud and its
ability to coordinate many mobile devices. It is precisely these features of the cloud that make it
an attractive choice here. In this paper, the cloud, viewed as a central aggregator, is an integral
part of the optimization process, and we leverage its scalability to aggregate ensemble-level
information, perform computations upon that data in a private manner, and then distribute these
private results to the agents.
The privacy implementation in this paper differs from the aforementioned references on private
optimization in several key ways. We are interested in solving problems in which the agents
collectively run an on-line optimization algorithm collaboratively by sharing (private functions of)
sensitive information. In the problems we consider, each iteration of the optimization algorithm
determines each agent’s next state. That is, the iterates of the optimization algorithm are the
agents’ states, and it is each agent’s desire to keep its state trajectory private to protect information
about its behavior. Accordingly, while the above references on private optimization keep other
problem data private, here we must keep entire trajectories of states private while optimizing.
In addition, we incorporate both nonlinear inequality constraints and set constraints, which, to
our knowledge, has not been explored in other privacy implementations.
Given the need to optimize while remaining private, encryption alone cannot provide the
privacy guarantees that are needed in the problems we examine. In the “upstream” direction,
encryption could be used to protect communications sent from the agents to the cloud, provided
the cloud could decrypt them. However in the “downstream” direction, when the cloud sends
transmissions to the agents, any encrypted messages from the cloud would naturally need to be
decrypted by the agents to allow each agent to update its state. While this strategy can protect
transmissions of sensitive data from eavesdroppers, having the agents decrypt transmissions from
the cloud would expose all agents’ sensitive data to each agent in the network, violating the
privacy guarantees that are required by each agent. Instead, what is required here is a privacy
implementation that protects user data from eavesdroppers and all others in the network, while
still making that data useful for optimizing. It is for this reason that we use differential privacy.
A preliminary version of this work appeared in [28]. The current paper adds a proof of
convergence, a convergence estimate, quantifies the privacy-convergence trade-off, and provides
new numerical results for two different privacy mechanisms. The rest of the paper is organized
as follows. Section II lays out the problem to be solved and its method of solution. Next,
Section III covers the necessary elements of differential privacy and relates them to the setting
of optimization. Then Section IV provides a proof of convergence for the optimization algorithm
used here and a bound on its convergence, in addition to exploring the trade-off between
privacy and convergence. Next, Section V provides simulation results to support the theoretical
developments made. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section we lay out the problem to be solved. First in Section II-A we lay out the multi-
agent problem and then, to aid in the exposition of its solution method, formulate an equivalent
ensemble problem. Then the solution to that problem will be discussed and, in Section II-B, will
be adapted to the cloud-based architecture used here.
A. Problem Overview
Consider N agents indexed over the set I := {1, . . . , N}, with agent i having state xi ∈ Rni
for some ni ∈ N. Agent i seeks to minimize the objective function
fi : Rni → R,
where fi depends only upon xi, that is, each agent’s objective function has no dependence upon
the other agents’ states. Using the notation ∇ifi := ∂fi∂xi , we state the following assumption for
objective functions.
Assumption 1: The function fi is C1 and convex, and ∇ifi is Lipschitz with constant Li for
all i ∈ I . 4
Assumption 1 allows for a broad class of functions to be used as objective functions, including
any C2 convex function on a compact, convex domain (cf. Assumption 2 below). Each agent’s
state is constrained to lie in a given set which we express as
xi ∈ Xi ⊂ Rni .
Regarding each set Xi, we state the following assumption.
Assumption 2: Each set Xi is non-empty, compact, and convex. 4
In particular Assumption 2 admits box constraints which are common in some multi-agent
problems.
Now define the ensemble state vector
x =

x1
x2
...
xN

∈ Rn,
where n =
∑N
i=1 ni. We impose global inequality constraints on the agents by requiring
g(x) :=

g1(x)
g2(x)
...
gm(x)

≤ 0,
where the above inequality is enforced component-wise, i.e., gj(x) ≤ 0 for all j ∈ J :=
{1, . . . ,m}. We now state our assumptions on g.
Assumption 3: The function g : Rn → Rm is C1 and convex. In addition, for Rm and Rn both
equipped with the same p-norm, the function gxj :=
∂g
∂xj
is Lipschitz continuous with constant
Kjp for all j ∈ J with respect to the metric induced by the p-norm. In addition the function g
is Lipschitz with constant Kgp with respect to the same metric. 4
In this paper we focus on the cases of p = 1 and p = 2. Like Assumption 1, Assumption 3
allows for any convex, C2 functions to be used for constraints whenever Assumption 2 holds.
We also have the following assumption on g.
Assumption 4: The constraints satisfy Slater’s condition, namely there exists a point x¯ ∈ X
such that g(x¯) < 0. 4
Assumption 4 is commonly enforced in nonlinear programming problems to guarantee that
strong duality holds. Under Assumptions 1-4, we state an ensemble-level optimization problem.
To do so, we define the ensemble objective
f(x) =
n∑
i=1
fi(xi),
and the set
X =
n∏
i=1
Xi,
where the product is meant in the Cartesian sense. To fix ideas, we state the following opti-
mization problem that does not yet incorporate privacy; privacy will be formally included in
Problem 1 in Section III.
Problem 0.1: (Preliminary; no privacy requirement)
minimize f(x)
subject to g(x) ≤ 0
x ∈ X.
♦
We note here that Problem 0.1 will be solved without having agent i share fi or Xi with the
other agents or with the cloud because these data are considered sensitive information. Similarly,
g is considered sensitive and the cloud does not share g with any of the agents. The Lagrangian
associated with Problem 0.1 is
L(x, µ) = f(x) + µTg(x),
where µ is a vector of Kuhn-Tucker multipliers in the non-negative orthant of Rm, denoted Rm+ .
Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 a primal solution xˆ exists and the set of all primal solutions is
non-empty and compact. With the addition of Assumption 4, a dual solution µˆ exists and the
optimal primal and dual values are equal [29, Proposition 6.4.3].
Under Assumptions 1-4, a point xˆ solves Problem 0.1 if and only if there exists a point
µˆ ∈ Rm+ such that (xˆ, µˆ) is a saddle point of L, that is, if and only if the point (xˆ, µˆ) satisfies
L(xˆ, µ) ≤ L(xˆ, µˆ) ≤ L(x, µˆ) (1)
for all (x, µ) ∈ X×Rm+ [29, Proposition 6.2.4]. It is as saddle points of L that we seek solutions
(xˆ, µˆ) to Problem 0.1.
Toward that end, we next define the symbols
Lx :=
∂L
∂x
, Lµ :=
∂L
∂µ
, gx :=
∂g
∂x
, and fx :=
∂f
∂x
,
and define the map
G(x, µ) =
 Lx(x, µ)
−Lµ(x, µ)
.
In what follows, it is necessary for G to be a Lipschitz mapping. Though the maps fx and gx
are Lipschitz by Assumptions 1 and 3, G itself cannot be shown to be Lipschitz because its
domain, X ×Rm+ , is unbounded by virtue of Rm+ being unbounded. To rectify this situation, we
use Equation (1) to find a non-empty, convex, compact set containing µˆ as was done in [30].
From the second inequality in Equation (1) we have
f(xˆ) + µˆTg(xˆ) ≤ f(x¯) + µˆTg(x¯)
for x¯ the Slater point as defined in Assumption 4. By the complementary slackness condition
we have
f(xˆ) ≤ f(x¯) + µˆTg(x¯).
Rearranging we find
m∑
j=1
µˆj ≤ f(x¯)− f(xˆ)
min
1≤j≤m
{−gj(x¯)} ≤
f(x¯)− f(x∗)
min
1≤j≤m
{−gj(x¯)} ,
where x∗ ∈ arg min
x∈X
f(x). We then define the set
M :=
µ ∈ Rm+ : ‖µ‖1 ≤ f(x¯)− f(x∗)min
1≤j≤m
{−gj(x¯)}

which is non-empty, compact, and convex by definition, and which contains µˆ. For economy of
notation, we define the symbols Z := X ×M and zˆ := (xˆ, µˆ), and we will use z := (x, µ) to
denote an arbitrary point in Z.
Since L(·, µ) is convex for all µ ∈M and L(x, ·) is concave for all x ∈ X , we see that G is
monotone [31, Theorem A]. Under Assumptions 1-4, a primal-dual pair (xˆ, µˆ) is a saddle point
of L if and only if it solves the following variational inequality (VI) [32, Corollary 11.1].
Problem 0.2: (VI formulation; no privacy requirement) Find a point zˆ ∈ Z such that
〈z − zˆ, G(zˆ)〉 ≥ 0
for all z ∈ Z. ♦
Further discussion on the equivalence of Problems 0.1 and 0.2 is given in [33], Sections 1.3.1,
1.3.2, and 1.4.1. Privacy is formally added to Problem 0.2 in the statement of Problem 1 in
Section III.
We will use the notation V I(K,F ) to denote the generic problem of finding a point x ∈ K
such that
〈y − x, F (x)〉 ≥ 0
for all y ∈ K, and we will use the notation SOL(K,F ) to denote the solution set of V I(K,F ).
The symbols Z and G refer to the specific problem under consideration in this paper so that
Problem 0.2 is denoted V I(Z,G) and its solution set is SOL(Z,G). It is in the setting of
variational inequalities that we will proceed and we focus on solving Problem 0.2 with the
understanding that its solutions also solve Problem 0.1.
For a compact set K and a monotone map F , one method of solving the variational inequality
V I(K,F ) is using a projection method with an iterative Tikhonov regularization as was done
for deterministic variational inequalities in [34] and for stochastic variational inequalities in [35];
these methods regularize the earlier Goldstein-Levitin-Polyak method for solving such problems
[36], [37]. The basic principle underlying these methods is that a point in SOL(K,F ) can be
approached iteratively with F specifying the direction in which to move at each iteration. To
endow this procedure with greater numerical stability and, as will be shown, robustness to noise,
the kth iteration specified in [34], [35] instead uses the direction specified by F + αkI with I
the identity map, αk > 0, and αk → 0. When F is monotone, each map F + αkI is strongly
monotone so that SOL(K,F + αkI) is a singleton. Letting ξk denote the (unique) element of
SOL(K,F +αkI), for αk > 0 and αk → 0 we have ξk → y0 where y0 is the least-norm element
of SOL(K,F ) (which itself is non-empty because K is compact and F is monotone).
Given an initial point z(0) ∈ Z, the deterministic form of the regularized method to solve
V I(Z,G) is given below in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Given a point z(0) ∈ Z, apply the update law
z(k + 1) = ΠZ
[
z(k)− γk
(
G
(
z(k)
)
+ αkz(k)
)]
=ΠZ
x(k)−γk(fx(x(k))+gx(x(k))Tµ(k)+αkx(k))
µ(k) + γk
(
g
(
x(k)
)− αkµ(k))
 (2)
until a fixed point zˆ is reached. ♦
Here αk is the regularization parameter at timestep k and γk is the step-size at the same
timestep. In Section III we will use Algorithm 1 to solve a private optimization problem, and in
Section IV we provide hypotheses on γk and αk sufficient for convergence. Currently we show
the applicability of this style of solution to the cloud architecture mentioned above.
B. Communications
If we separate the update law in Algorithm 1 to examine the per-agent (primal) update law,
we find that agent i executes
xi(k + 1) = ΠXi
[
xi(k)− γk
(∇ifi(xi(k)) + gxi(x(k))Tµ(k) + αkxi(k))
]
. (3)
The only terms on the right-hand side of this update law that contain information from other
agents are gxi
(
x(k)
)
and µ(k). Though gxi is a function of all states in the network, the agents
do not send their states to each other directly to allow for its computation because doing so
may reveal sensitive information. Instead, every agent sends its state to a trusted cloud computer
which computes gxi(x(k)) for every i ∈ I . Because no agent has every agent’s state value, no
agent can compute µ(k) (cf. Equation (2)) and therefore the cloud computes µ(k) as well using
the update law
µ(k + 1) = ΠM
[
µ(k) + γk
(
g
(
x(k)
)− αkµ(k))].
Then, to use Algorithm 1 with this architecture, the cloud sends (private forms of) gxi
(
x(k)
)
and µ(k) to agent i; the modifications to these quantities to make them private are covered
in Section III. The cloud is assumed to be a powerful computer capable of carrying out these
calculations quickly so that they reliably arrive at the agents in a timely fashion.
With this communications scheme, at timestep k four actions occur. First, agent i sends xi(k)
to the cloud and the cloud assembles all agents’ states into the vector x(k). Second, the cloud
computes µ(k) and gxi
(
x(k)
)
for all i ∈ I in a differentially private way. Third, the cloud
sends a private form of gxi
(
x(k)
)T
µ(k) to agent i. Fourth, agent i computes xi(k + 1) while
the cloud simultaneously computes µ(k + 1), and then this sequence of communications and
computations is repeated. Because this happens at every timestep, information in the network is
always synchronized when computations occur and there is no disagreement between the agents
or cloud as to what the value of a particular state is. As a result, the computations that are spread
across the network in this manner produce identical results to Algorithm 1, and the ensemble
problem is, mathematically, equivalent to the cloud-based multi-agent problem.
For simplicity, the forthcoming analysis will be carried out in the ensemble setting. Despite
the mathematical equivalence between the multi-agent and ensemble approaches, the advantage
of the cloud-based approach in practice is that it allows for each agent’s state trajectory to be
kept private while the ensemble approach does not.
III. PRIVATE OPTIMIZATION
Differential privacy originates in the database literature in computer science and was originally
designed to keep individual entries of a database private [20]. It has recently been extended to
the setting of dynamical systems in [21]. Differential privacy offers a formal definition of privacy
as well as resilience to post-processing and robustness to side information. This resilience to
post-processing prevents an adversary from weakening the guarantees of differential privacy
by performing post-hoc calculations on private information. Robustness to side information
guarantees that an adversary cannot use information it has gleaned from an alternate source
to fully defeat differential privacy. Below we first review differential privacy, then give a formal
private optimization problem statement, and finally discuss applying privacy to Problem 0.2.
A. Differentially Private Systems
Let there be N input signals to a system, each contributed by some user. The ith input signal is
denoted ui and is contained in the set ˜`sipi , namely the space of sequences of si-vectors equipped
with the pi norm, with si, pi ∈ N, such that every finite truncation of ui is in `sipi . More explicitly,
let ui(k) denote the kth element of ui and define
PTui =

ui(k) for k ≤ T
0 otherwise.
Then we say ui ∈ ˜`sipi if and only if PTui has finite pi-norm for all values of T . Using this
definition, the full input space to the system is
˜`s
p =
N∏
i=1
˜`si
pi
,
where the product is meant in the Cartesian sense, and the system produces outputs in
y ∈ ˜`rq.
In this paper we consider the cases where pi = 1 for all i ∈ I or pi = 2 for all i ∈ I . In the
case of pi = 1, the full input space to the system is ˜`s1 and we use the ordinary 1-norm on this
space. For pi = 2, we likewise use the ordinary 2-norm on ˜`s2. While each of ‖ · ‖1 and ‖ · ‖2
will be used for both the 1-norm and 2-norm on Rn and ˜`sp, the intent of each symbol can be
discerned from its argument each time it is used.
To implement differential privacy, we must specify which inputs we wish to generate “similar”
outputs. To do this, fix a real number B > 0 and define the binary symmetric adjacency relation
AdjB : ˜`
s
p × ˜`sp → {0, 1} as
AdjB(u, u˜) = 1⇔ ‖u− u˜‖p ≤ B. (4)
Two inputs u and u˜ for which Adj(u, u˜) = 1 are called “adjacent.”
Towards making precise the notion of “similar” outputs, fix a probability space (Ω,F ,P) and
let Bd denote the Borel σ-algebra on Rd. Differential privacy is enforced by a mechanism,
which is a map M taking the form
M : ˜`sp × Ω→ ˜`rq,
and the role of a mechanism is to approximate a system whose inputs are sensitive information.
We now state the definition of a differentially private mechanism. In this definition, we use a
σ-algebra over ˜`rq, denoted Σq,r.
1
Definition 1: A mechanism M : ˜`sp ×Ω→ ˜`rq is (, δ)-differentially private if and only if, for
all adjacent u, u˜ ∈ ˜`sp we have
P(M(u) ∈ S) ≤ eP(M(u˜) ∈ S) + δ (5)
for all S ∈ Σq,r. ♦
In Equation (5) it is  and δ that determine the privacy policy and smaller values of each
imply a greater level of privacy for users. In general  should be kept small and typical values
1An explicit construction of this σ-algebra can be found in [21, Section III-A], though we avoid a lengthy exposition on Σq,r
due to the relatively minor role its technical details play in the current work.
for  range from 0.1 to ln 3. On the other hand, δ should be kept as small as possible because it
allows for zero probability events for M(u˜) to have non-zero probability for M(u) and therefore
can allow for important losses in privacy by making it easy for an adversary to distinguish
between outputs. Common values for δ range from 0 to 0.05; (, 0)-differential privacy is called
-differential privacy and, in general, -differential privacy is stronger than (, δ)-differential
privacy precisely because of the aforementioned losses in privacy that can come from δ > 0. For
this reason, (, δ)-differential privacy can be regarded as a δ-approximate form of -differential
privacy [38]. For a fixed value of , the benefit of using even small values of δ > 0 is that the
variance of noise added can be reduced while maintaining “almost” the same level of privacy.
B. Private Optimization Problem Statement
In the setting of Problem 0.2, we want to protect the state trajectory, x =
(
x(k)
)
k∈N, which
is a sensitive signal in ˜`sp, and in so doing we protect each individual agent’s state trajectory; for
agent i this is xi ∈ ˜`sipi . As discussed in Section II, keeping individual agents’ state trajectories
private is necessary when the cloud computes gxi and µ at each time k. To implement privacy
in these computations, we regard each gxi as a deterministic, causal, memory-less dynamical
system and seek to make each such system differentially private. Similarly, we regard g as a
deterministic, causal, memory-less dynamical system and seek to make it differentially private
as well. Due to the post-processing property of differential privacy, computing µ using a private
form of g also implies that µ keeps each xi private.
As discussed in Section II, the agents do not communicate with each other at all and,
instead, each agent only sends its state to the cloud. The cloud handles all required centralized
computations and sends (privatized forms of) their results to the agents. Denoting by gˆxi and gˆ
the private forms of gxi and g, respectively, at time k the cloud sends to agent i the vector
pˆi(k) = gˆxi
(
x(k)
)T
gˆ
(
x(k)
)
.
We are interested in having a team of agents optimize by having the cloud send agent i only
pˆi(k) at time k. We require that pˆi(k) protect xi for all i ∈ I , and we implement privacy by
approximating gxi (for all i ∈ I) and g by differentially private mechanisms. Using this method of
communications, we state the following problem that incorporates both optimization and privacy
objectives, and respects the fact that the objectives and constraints in this problem are sensitive
data.
Problem 1: (Private optimization) Solve Problem 0.2 using Algorithm 1 while
i. the agents communicate only with the cloud (i.e., there is no inter-agent communication)
ii. the cloud makes the systems g and gxi , i ∈ I (whose inputs are the agents’ state trajectories)
differentially private in the sense of Definition 1
iii. agent i does not share fi or Xi with any other agent or the cloud
iv. the cloud does not share g with any agent. ♦
Towards solving Problem 1, we now review mechanisms which implement differential privacy
for dynamical systems.
C. Privacy-Preserving Mechanisms
To define a mechanism for enforcing differential privacy, we must first also define the sen-
sitivity of a system, which is used to determine the variance of noise that must be added in
a privacy-preserving mechanism. Letting G be a deterministic causal system, the sensitivity of
G is an upper bound on the distance between G(u) and G(u˜) whenever AdjB(u, u˜) = 1 holds.
Formally we define the `p sensitivity of G, denoted ∆pG, as
∆pG := sup
u,u˜:AdjB(u,u˜)=1
‖G(u)− G(u˜)‖p.
The mechanism we will use for -differential privacy is the Laplace mechanism, which adds
noise drawn from a Laplace distribution. Below we use the notation Lap(µ, b) to denote the
Laplace distribution with mean µ and scale parameter b.
Theorem 1: ([21, Theorem 4]) Let the adjacency relation defined in Equation (4) be used with
p = 1 and let G be a system with sensitivity ∆1G. Let a constant  ≥ 0 be given and recall that
r is the dimension of the output space. Then the mechanism
M(x) = G(x) + w
where w(k) ∼ Lap(0, b/)r and b ≥ ∆1G is -differentially private. 
For (, δ)-differential privacy, we will use the Gaussian mechanism. Its definition requires that
we first define κ(δ, ) using the Q-function,
Q(y) := 1√
2pi
∫ ∞
y
e−
v2
2 dv.
The function κ(δ, ) is defined for  ≥ 0 and 0 < δ < 1
2
as
κ(δ, ) :=
1
2
(
Kδ +
√
K2δ + 2
)
,
where Kδ = Q−1(δ). We now define the Gaussian mechanism.
Theorem 2: ([21, Theorem 3]) Let the adjacency relation defined in Equation (4) be used with
p = 2 and let G be a system with sensitivity ∆2G, with constants  ≥ 0 and 0 < δ < 12 given
and r the dimension of the output space. Then the mechanism
M(x) = G(x) + w
where w(k) ∼ N (0, σ2Ir) is (, δ)-differentially private for σ ≥ κ(δ, )∆2G. 
Theorems 1 and 2 provide a lower bound on the variance of each noise that is added and we
assume that these variances are also chosen to be finite. We now compute the sensitivities that
are needed to implement differential privacy in Problem 1.
D. Computing Sensitivities
In Problem 1 it is desired to protect the value of x, including from agents in the network.
In the per-agent update law in Equation (3), x(k) appears in gxi and gxi must therefore be
made private before the cloud sends gxi(x(k)) to agent i. To protect x in this way, the cloud
adds noise directly to gxi
(
x(k)
)
, and the variance of noise that must be added depends on the
sensitivity of gxi . To compute the sensitivity of gxi we regard it as a memoryless dynamical
system and generalize it to act on entire signals of states. Recalling that x(k) ∈ X for all k,
under Assumption 2, X is bounded and therefore x(k) is as well for all k ∈ N. Then x ∈ ˜`np .
We now overload the notation gxi by allowing it to act on elements of ˜`
n
p . In particular, gxi
acts on elements of Rn as before and for state trajectories x ∈ ˜`np we define
gxi(x) :=
(
gxi(x(k))
)
k∈N.
We now fix a real scalar B > 0. For two state trajectories, x, x˜ ∈ ˜`np such that AdjB(x, x˜) = 1
holds, we compute the sensitivity of gxi according to
∆pgxi = sup
x,x˜:AdjB(x,x˜)=1
‖gxi(x)− gxi(x˜)‖p
≤ sup
x,x˜:AdjB(x,x˜)=1
Kip
p
√√√√ ∞∑
k=0
‖x(k)− x˜(k)‖pp ≤ KipB,
where we have used ‖x − x˜‖p ≤ B and where this bound on the sensitivity holds for gxi for
all i ∈ I .
In computing µ(k), the cloud must also add noise in some fashion because µ(k) depends upon
x(k). We regard g as a dynamical system and make it private, and the resilience of differential
privacy to post-processing guarantees that µ =
(
µ(k)
)
k∈N keeps x private. To compute the
sensitivity of g we extend it to act on x ∈ ˜`np as above. For x, x˜ ∈ ˜`np satisfying AdjB(x, x˜) = 1
we use the same procedure as was used above for gxi to find
∆pg = sup
x,x˜:AdjB(x,x˜)=1
‖g(x)− g(x˜)‖p ≤ KgpB.
Having computed the requisite sensitivities, we return to solving Problem 1.
E. Optimizing in the Presence of Noise
We now examine how noise appears in Algorithm 1 once it has been added for privacy. For
gxi
(
x(k)
)
we add noise wi(k) ∈ Rm×ni drawn from either a Laplace or Gaussian distribution
and for g
(
x(k)
)
we add noise wg(k) ∈ Rm drawn from the same class of distribution as the wi,
with all noises independent. Define wx by
wx = (w1 w2 · · · wn) ∈ Rm×n.
In ensemble form the private dynamics under consideration are
z(k + 1) =
 x(k + 1)
µ(k + 1)

= ΠZ
z(k)− γk
 fx(x(k))+ ( ∂g∂x(x(k))+ wx(k))Tµ(k) + αkx(k)
−g(x(k))+ wg(k) + αkµ(k)
.
Expanding, we find
z(k + 1) =
 x(k + 1)
µ(k + 1)
 (6)
= ΠZ
z(k)− γk
 fx(x(k))+ ∂g∂x(x(k))Tµ(k) + wx(k)Tµ(k) + αkx(k)
−g(x(k))+ wg(k) + αkµ(k)
.
Because µ(k) ∈ Rm+ , each element of wx(k)Tµ(k) is some weighted combination of elements
of wx(k) with non-negative weights. Combined with the independence of the noises used for
privacy, this results in each entry of wx(k)Tµ(k) being a random variable having variance that
is the weighted sum of variances of elements of wx(k). With this in mind we define the random
vector ws(k) = wx(k)Tµ(k) (which we note has finite variance since µ(k) is contained in M
and wx(k) has finite variance), and zero mean (because wi(k) has zero mean for all k ∈ N and
all i ∈ I). Then we can rewrite Equation (6) as
z(k + 1) = ΠZ
z(k)− γk
 fx(x(k))+ ∂g∂x(x(k))Tµ(k) + ws(k) + αkx(k)
−g(x(k))+ wg(k) + αkµ(k)

= ΠZ
[
z(k)− γk
(
G
(
z(k)
)
+ αkz(k) + w(k)
)]
,
where w(k) denotes the noise added at timestep k and aggregates all noisy signals used for
privacy. We state this stochastic update law as Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Given z(0) ∈ Z, apply the update law
z(k + 1) = ΠZ
[
z(k)− γk
(
G
(
z(k)
)
+ αkz(k) + w(k)
)]
until a fixed point zˆ ∈ Z is reached. ♦
We note that by its definition E[w(k)] = 0, and observe that this noisy update law is equivalent
to Algorithm 1 with an additional noise term added.
IV. CONVERGENCE OF PRIVATE OPTIMIZATION
In this section we prove the convergence of Algorithm 2. Algorithm 2 was first presented in
[34] without noise and was presented in its noisy form in [35]. Both papers omit proofs and, due
to the heavy dependence of this work upon Algorithm 2 we provide a proof here. To the best of
our knowledge a proof of the convergence of Algorithm 2 as stated in [35] is not available in the
literature; similar work is presented in [39], [40] which cover algorithms related to Algorithm 2,
though those works impose additional assumptions upon αk and γk due to the differences in the
problems studied in those works.
A. Main Convergence Result
Now we explore in depth solving variational inequalities using a Tikhonov regularized pro-
jection method, the basic elements of which are covered in [33, Section 12.2]. Earlier it was
stated that if SOL(K,F ) 6= ∅, then for ξk ∈ SOL(K,F + αkI) we have ξk → z0 where z0 is
the least-norm element of SOL(K,F ). Using that {ξk}k∈N is a convergent sequence, we find
that {‖ξk‖}k∈N is bounded and, in particular, there is some Mξ such that ‖ξk‖ ≤ Mξ for all k,
e.g., ‖ξk‖ ≤ supz∈Z ‖z‖.
Using this fact, the following lemma relates points z(k) generated by Algorithm 2 to successive
solutions to the problems V I(Z,G+αkI) (each with αk held constant). Recalling that ξk is the
unique solution to V I(Z,G+ αkI), we have the following result.
Lemma 1: For all k ∈ N
‖z(k)− ξk‖2 ≤ (1 + γkαk)‖z(k)− ξk−1‖2 +M2ξ
(
αk−1 − αk
αk
)2(
1 + γkαk
γkαk
)
.
Proof: First note that because ξk solves V I(K,G+ αkI), we have
(ξk−1 − ξk)T
(
G(ξk) + αkξk
) ≥ 0. (7)
Similarly for ξk−1 we find
(ξk − ξk−1)T
(
G(ξk−1) + αk−1ξk−1
) ≥ 0. (8)
Summing Equations (7) and (8), and using the monotonicity of G gives
(ξk−1 − ξk)T (αkξk − αk−1ξk−1) ≥ 0.
Adding and subtracting αkξk−1 inside the second set of parentheses then gives
(ξk−1 − ξk)T (αkI − αk−1I)ξk−1
≥ αk(ξk−1 − ξk)T (ξk−1 − ξk) = αk‖ξk−1 − ξk‖2.
Using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality results in
‖ξk−1 − ξk‖ ≤ |αk−1 − αk|
αk
Mξ. (9)
Expanding the term ‖z(k) + ξk−1 − ξk−1 − ξk‖2 and applying Equation (9) then gives
‖z(k)− ξk‖2 ≤ ‖z(k)− ξk−1‖2 +
(
αk−1 − αk
αk
)2
M2ξ
+ 2
( |αk−1 − αk|
αk
)
Mξ‖z(k)− ξk−1‖. (10)
For the third term on the right-hand side above we have
2
( |αk−1 − αk|
αk
)
Mξ‖z(k)− ξk−1‖
= 2
√
γkαk‖z(k)− ξk−1‖
( |αk−1 − αk|
αk
√
γkαk
)
Mξ
≤ γkαk‖z(k)− ξk−1‖2 +M2ξ
(
(αk−1 − αk)2
γkα3k
)
, (11)
where we have used that fact that a2 + b2 ≥ 2ab for a, b ∈ R.
Substituting Equation (11) into Equation (10) gives the desired result. 
The other lemma we need concerns the convergence of sequences of random variables and
enables a Lyapunov-like argument to be made for their convergence.
Lemma 2: ([41], Lemma 10, Page 49) Let v0, . . . , vk be a sequence of independent random
variables with vk ≥ 0 and E[v0] <∞. Suppose that
E[vk+1] ≤ (1− τk)vk + σk,
with
0 ≤ τk ≤ 1, σk ≥ 0,
∞∑
k=0
τk =∞, σk
τk
→ 0.
Then E[vk]→ 0. If, in addition, we have
∞∑
k=0
σk <∞,
then vk → 0 almost surely and
P(vj ≤  for all j ≥ k) ≥ 1− 1

(
E[vk] +
∞∑
i=k
σi
)
.

We now prove the convergence of Algorithm 2.
Theorem 3: Let Assumptions 1-4 hold. Suppose that γk > 0 and αk > 0 satisfy the following
four conditions:
1)
∑∞
k=0 γkαk =∞
2) γk
αk
→ 0
3) αk → 0
4) (αk−1−αk)
γkα
2
k
→ 0.
Then for noise signal w with E[w(k)] = 0 and bounded variance for all k ∈ N, for the update
rule
z(k + 1) = ΠZ
[
z(k)− γk
(
G
(
z(k)
)
+ αkz(k) + w(k)
)]
we have E[‖z(k)− z0‖2]→ 0, where z0 is the least-norm solution to Problem 0.2.
Let LG be the Lipschitz constant of G. If, in addition to the above, the sequence of terms
σk :=
(
1− γkαk
(
2− γkαk − γk
αk
L2G − 2γkLG
))
M2ξ ·
(
αk−1 − αk
αk
)2(
1 + γkαk
γkαk
)
+ γ2kE[‖w(k)‖2]
is summable, then the convergence estimate
P(‖z(j)− ξj−1‖2 ≤  for all j ≥ k) ≥ 1− 1

(
E[‖z(k)− ξk−1‖2] +
∞∑
i=k
σi
)
(12)
holds.
Proof: It was established in Section II-A that SOL(Z,G) 6= ∅ so that ξk → z0 where z0 is the
least-norm element of SOL(Z,G) and where ξk solves V I(Z,G + αkI). We now show that
z(k + 1)→ ξk.
Because ξk solves V I(Z,G+ αkI) we have
ξk = ΠZ
[
ξk − γk
(
G(ξk) + αkξk
)]
.
Using the non-expansive property of the projection operator and taking the expectation of both
sides we find
E
[‖z(k + 1)− ξk‖2] =
E
[∥∥∥ΠZ[z(k)− γk(G(z(k)) + αkz(k) + w(k))]− ΠZ[ξk − γk(G(ξk) + αkξk)]∥∥∥2]
≤ E
[
‖z(k)− ξk + γk(G(ξk)−G(z(k)))− γkαk(z(k)− ξk)− γkw(k)‖2
]
≤ ‖z(k)− ξk‖2 − 2γkαk‖z(k)− ξk‖2 + γ2k‖G(ξk)−G(z(k))‖2
+ 2γ2kαk(G(ξk)−G(z(k)))T (ξk − z(k)) + γ2kα2k‖ξk − z(k)‖2 + γ2kE[‖w(k)‖2]
where the last inequality follows from the monotonicity of G, and where the fact that E[w(k)] = 0
has caused all terms containing w(k) except E[‖w(k)‖2] to vanish.
Using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality then gives
E[‖z(k + 1)− ξk‖2] ≤ ‖z(k)− ξk‖2 − 2γkαk‖z(k)− ξk‖2
+ γ2k‖G(ξk)−G(z(k))‖2 + 2γ2kαk‖G(ξk)−G(z(k))‖‖ξk − z(k)‖
+ γ2kα
2
k‖ξk − z(k)‖2 + γ2kE[‖w(k)‖2].
Assumptions 1-3 and the compactness of M together imply that G is Lipschitz and, denoting
its Lipschitz constant by LG, we have
E[‖z(k + 1)− ξk‖2] ≤(
1− 2γkαk + γ2kL2G + 2γ2kαkLG + γ2kα2k
)
‖z(k)− ξk‖2 + γ2kE[‖w(k)‖2].
Defining
θk := 1− γkαk
(
2− γkαk − γk
αk
L2G − 2γkLG
)
and
ρk := M
2
ξ
(
αk−1 − αk
αk
)2(
1 + γkαk
γkαk
)
,
applying Lemma 1 then gives
E[‖z(k + 1)− ξk‖2] ≤ θk(1 + γkαk)‖z(k)− ξk−1‖2 + θkρk + γ2kE[‖w(k)‖2]. (13)
By hypothesis we have
γkαk → 0, γk
αk
→ 0, γk → 0,
with αk > 0 and γk > 0 for all k. Then there exists an M > 0 such that for all k ≥M we have
γkαk ∈ (0, 1) and 0 ≤ 1− 2γkαk ≤ θk ≤ 1− γkαk.
Then for all k ≥M
θk(1 + γkαk) ≤ θk + γkαk
and thus for all k ≥M
θk(1 + γkαk) ≤ 1− γkαk(1− γkαk − γk
αk
L2G − 2γkLG) ∈ (0, 1).
In particular, take some θ ∈ (0, 1) so that
1− γkαk
(
1− γkαk − γk
αk
L2G − 2γkLG
)
≤ 1− γkαkθ
for all k ≥M . Then 1− γkαkθ ∈ (0, 1). Setting τk = γkαkθ and σk = ρkθk + γ2kE[‖w(k)‖2] we
rewrite Equation (13) as
E[‖z(k + 1)− ξk‖2] ≤ (1− τk)‖z(k)− ξk−1‖2 + σk. (14)
All that remains is to show that the conditions of Lemma 2 are met. First, τk ∈ (0, 1) by
construction. For all k ≥M we have ρk ≥ 0 and θk ≥ 0 so that σk ≥ 0. Regarding summability
of τk we find
∞∑
k=M
τk = θ
∞∑
k=M
γkαk =∞
by hypothesis. To show that σk/τk → 0 we have
σk
τk
=
θk
(
αk−1−αk
αk
)2(
1+γkαk
γkαk
)
M2ξ + γ
2
kE[‖w(k)‖2]
γkαkθ
= (1− 2γkαk + γ2kα2k + γ2kL2G + 2αkγ2kLG)M2ξ
·
(
αk−1 − αk
γkα2k
)2
(1 + γkαk)
1
θ
+
1
θ
γk
αk
E[‖w(k)‖2].
Using the hypotheses regarding γk and αk we have
1− 2γkαk + γ2kα2k + γ2kL2G + 2αkγ2kLG → 1, 1 + γkαk → 1,
along with (
αk−1 − αk
γkα2k
)2
→ 0,
so that the first term in σk
τk
goes to zero. It was established in Section III-E that E[‖w(k)‖2] is
bounded above for all k, namely that E[‖w(k)‖2] ≤ Kw for some Kw > 0. Because γkαk → 0 we
have γk
αk
Kw → 0 and hence σkτk → 0 as desired and the first part of the theorem follows from
Lemma 2.
When the sequence {σk}k∈N is summable, the additional convergence estimate is a straight-
forward application of Lemma 2 as well. 
One valid choice of γk and αk satisfying conditions 1-4 in Theorem 3 is
α = α¯k−c1 and γ = γ¯k−c2 ,
with α¯ > 0, γ¯ > 0, 0 < c1 < c2, and c1 + c2 < 1 [35].
B. Convergence Rate Estimates
For the above choice of step-size, we derive bounds on c1 and c2 which are sufficient to make
σk summable. As shown in the proof of Theorem 3, there exists an M > 0 such that for all
k ≥M we have θk ∈ (0, 1), so that for all k ≥M we have
σk ≤M2ξ
(
αk−1 − αk
αk
)2(
1 + γkαk
γkαk
)
+ γ2kE
[‖w(k)‖2]. (15)
To make the second term in Equation (15) summable, we can set
γk = γ¯k
−c2
with c2 > 12 . Again using Kw to denote an upper bound on the variance of w(k) gives
∞∑
k=1
γ2kE[‖w(k)‖2] ≤ γ¯2Kwζ(2c2), (16)
where ζ(·) is the Riemann zeta function [42], defined as
ζ(p) =
∞∑
n=1
1
np
,
which takes finite values for arguments p > 1.
Regarding the first term in Equation (15), we note that there is some Mˆ > 0 such that
1 ≤ 1
α¯γ¯k−c1k−c2
for all k ≥ Mˆ and therefore(
αk−1 − αk
αk
)2(
1 + γkαk
γkαk
)
≤ 2
(
αk−1 − αk
αk
)2
1
α¯γ¯k−(c1+c2)
for all such k. Substituting αk = α¯k−c1 and expanding the squared term gives
2
(
αk−1 − αk
αk
)2
1
α¯γ¯k−(c1+c2)
= 2
[(
1− 1
k
)−2c1 − 2(1− 1
k
)−c1 + 1]
α¯γ¯k−(c1+c2)
. (17)
To approximate the terms containing 1/k we use a (truncated) power series expansion, namely
that for x ∈ (−1, 1)
(1− x)−r ≈ 1 + rx+ 1
2
r(r + 1)x2 +
1
6
r(r + 1)(r + 2)x3. (18)
Applying Equation (18) to Equation (17) gives
2
[(
1− 1
k
)−2c1 − 2(1− 1
k
)−c1 + 1]
α¯γ¯k−(c1+c2)
≈ 2c
2
1
α¯γ¯k2−(c1+c2)
+
2(c31 + c
2
1)
α¯γ¯k3−(c1+c2)
.
We see that sums of such terms are given by
∞∑
k=1
2
[(
1− 1
k
)−2c1 − 2(1− 1
k
)−c1 + 1]
α¯γ¯k−(c1+c2)
≈ 2c
2
1
α¯γ¯
ζ(2− (c1 + c2)) + 2(c
3
1 + c
2
1)
α¯γ¯
ζ(3− (c1 + c2)). (19)
Returning to Equation (15) and using the results of Equations (16) and (19) gives
∞∑
k=1
σk / γ¯2Kwζ(2c2) +
2c21
α¯γ¯
ζ(2− (c1 + c2)) + 2(c
3
1 + c
2
1)
α¯γ¯
ζ(3− (c1 + c2)). (20)
Due to the approximations made and ranges of k considered in bounding this sum, we can
only guarantee that the convergence estimate relying on
∑∞
k=1 σk will hold for k ≥ max{M, Mˆ}.
However, for k ≤ M we will often have σk < 0 (as when LG is large) and thus we expect the
bound in Equation (20) to hold for a range of values of k ≤ M because negative terms with
such indices have been over-estimated by including positive terms at such indices in Equation
(20). In addition, we expect α¯ and γ¯ to be small enough that Mˆ will often be small, e.g., less
than 10, thus allowing this bound to hold over a wide range of values of k.
To apply the bound in Equation (12), we also need to estimate the term E[‖z(k) − ξk−1‖2].
Returning to Equation (14) and taking the expectation of both sides one timestep earlier gives
E[‖z(k)− ξk−1‖2] ≤ (1− τk−1)E[‖z(k − 1)− ξk−2‖2] + σk−1, (21)
which is a (time-varying) affine recurrence relation in the expected error in the optimization
algorithm. Solving Equation (21) (see e.g., [43], Section 2.1.1.2), we find that
E[‖z(k)− ξk−1‖2] =
(
k−1∏
n=0
(1− τn)
)(
E[‖z(1)− ξ0‖2] +
k−1∑
m=0
σm∏m
i=0(1− τi)
)
.
Defining the diameter of the set Z via Dz = supz1,z2∈Z ‖z1− z2‖, we can bound the initial error
via E[‖z(1)− ξ0‖2] ≤ D2z , giving
E[‖z(k)− ξk−1‖2] ≤
(
k−1∏
n=0
(1− τn)
)(
D2z +
k−1∑
m=0
σm∏m
i=0(1− τi)
)
. (22)
In Equation (12), one can compute the sum
∑∞
i=k σi by using the analytic bound for
∑∞
k=1 σk
given in Equation (20) and subtracting the first k − 1 values of σi from this value. Combined
with the upper bound on E[‖z(k)− ξk−1‖2] given in Equation (22), one can then use the bound
in Equation (12) to determine the probability with which the error in the optimization algorithm
stays within some bound for all time. Having explored convergence in the presence of privacy,
we now examine the trade-off between the two competing objectives of privacy and convergence.
C. The Trade-off Between Privacy and Convergence
In this section we derive a quantifiable trade-off between privacy and convergence, and for
concreteness we focus on the case of -differential privacy, though a similar trade-off can be
derived for (, δ)-differential privacy.
Returning to Equation (13) we find the inequality
E[‖z(k + 1)− ξk‖2] ≤ θk(1 + αkγk)‖z(k)− ξk−1‖2 + θkρk + γ2kE[‖w(k)‖2], (23)
where we see that only the term E[‖w(k)‖2] depends upon the noise added for privacy. Given
that w(k) has zero mean, we find E[‖w(k)‖2] = var(w(k)). In the case of -differential privacy
we have w(k) ∼ Lap(0, b/)r so that
var[w(k)] =
W
2
, (24)
where W := W (∆1g,∆1gxi , B) is a constant that depends upon the systems of interest, g and
gxi , and the adjacency parameter, B.
Returning to Equation (23) and substituting in Equation (24) we find
E[‖z(k + 1)− ξk‖2] ≤ θk(1 + αkγk)‖z(k)− ξk−1‖2 + θkρk + γ2k
W
2
.
The additive term γ2k
W
2
is the only term in which the privacy parameter  appears, and this term
can be regarded as a penalty on convergence because it allows the expected error E[‖z(k +
1)− ξk‖2] to grow from ‖z(k)− ξk−1‖. Viewing this term as a convergence penalty then reveals
a fundamental trade-off between privacy and convergence: implementing -differential privacy
comes at the cost of a convergence penalty proportional to 1/2. We state this trade-off succinctly
and informally by writing
Privacy()⇐⇒ Convergence(−2).
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
Below we present numerical simulation results for a system with n = 10 agents and m = 6
constraints. We simulate both - and (, δ)-differential privacy.
A. Example Problem
Let there be n = 10 agents, each with state xi ∈ R2 and using ensemble objective function
f(x) =
(
(x1,1 − 5) + (x1,2 + 5)
)
+ ‖x2‖2 +
∥∥∥∥∥∥x3 −
 −7
7
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
+
(
(x4,1 − 8) + (x4,2 − 8)
)
+
∥∥∥∥∥∥x5 +
 3
3
∥∥∥∥∥∥
4
+
(
(x6,1 − 10) + (x6,2 − 10)
)
+
(
(x7,1 + 10) + (x7,2 + 10)
)
+
∥∥∥∥∥∥x8 +
 7
0
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
+
(
(x9,1 − 6) + x9,2
)
+
∥∥∥∥∥∥x10 −
 0
8
∥∥∥∥∥∥
4
,
where xi,j is the jth state of agent i and the per-agent objectives can be discerned in the obvious
way. The constraints on the agents are
g(x) =

‖x1‖2 + ‖x2‖2 + ‖x3‖2 − 10
‖x4‖2 + ‖x5‖2 + ‖x6‖2 − 50
‖x7‖2 + ‖x8‖2 + ‖x9‖2 − 50
x21,1 + x5,1 + x
2
10,1 − 50
x24,2 + x7,1 + x9,2 − 20
‖x8‖2 + ‖x6‖2 − 30

≤ 0.
Each agent was also constrained to lie in the box Xi = [−10, 10]× [−10, 10]. The Lipschitz
constants of g were computed to be Kg1 = 39.82 and K
g
2 = 56.71. The Lipschitz constants for
each gxi are shown in Table I.
i Ki1 K
i
2
1 4
√
8
2 2 2
3 2 2
4 2 2
5 2 2
6 4
√
8
7 2 2
8 4
√
8
9 2 2
10 2 2
TABLE I
VALUES OF Ki1 AND Ki2 FOR gxi , i ∈ {1, . . . , 10}
In both simulation runs below, the step-size rule discussed at the end of Section IV was used
with the values
α¯ = 0.1, γ¯ = 0.01, c1 = 0.3, and c2 = 0.52,
and all states and Kuhn-Tucker multipliers were initialized to zero, i.e., xi(0) = 0 for all i ∈ I
and µ(0) = 0.
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Fig. 1. The values of ‖x(k)−x0‖2 for k = 1, . . . , 100, 000 under -differential privacy with Algorithm 2. The steady, monotone
descent toward x0 indicates numerical convergence to x0 in the presence of noise.
B. Simulation of -differential privacy
The adjacency parameter was chosen to be B = 1. The value  = ln 2 was used for all systems.
The distribution and variance of each entry of each noisy signal were computed and are listed
in Table II where we use the notation for the PDF of a random scalar with the understanding
that each entry of the random matrices wi was generated using such a distribution.
Noise Distribution Variance
w1 Lap(0, 5.771) 66.60
w2 Lap(0, 2.885) 16.65
w3 Lap(0, 2.885) 16.65
w4 Lap(0, 2.885) 16.65
w5 Lap(0, 2.885) 16.65
w6 Lap(0, 5.771) 66.60
w7 Lap(0, 2.885) 16.65
w8 Lap(0, 5.771) 66.60
w9 Lap(0, 2.885) 16.65
w10 Lap(0, 2.885) 16.65
TABLE II
NOISY SIGNALS AND THEIR DISTRIBUTIONS FOR -DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
The distribution for wg was Lap(0, 57.45) with variance 6.600 · 103. Using this problem
formulation, Algorithm 2 was run for 100, 000 iterations. To show the behavior of the algorithm
over time, the least-norm saddle point of L, z0 = (x0, µ0), was computed ahead of time and
the values of ‖x(k) − x0‖2 and ‖µ(k) − µ0‖2 are shown in Figures 1 and 2, respectively, for
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Fig. 2. The values of ‖µ(k) − µ0‖2 for k = 1, . . . , 100, 000 under -differential privacy with Algorithm 2. Here we see an
initial descent followed by a period of oscillations as µ(k) approaches µ0.
1 ≤ k ≤ 100, 0002.
In Figures 1 and 2 we see a clear decreasing trend in both ‖x(k) − x0‖2 and ‖µ(k) − µ0‖2,
with the primal error appearing to be monotonically decreasing and the dual error oscillating
while showing a general decreasing trend. The oscillations seen are expected given that the
variance of the noises added is constant while G decreases in magnitude as the saddle point z0
is approached. In fact, it is known that descent will be achieved in a gradient method as long
as the norm of noise added to the gradient is less than the norm of the gradient itself [44]. In
light of this fact, the trends seen in Figures 1 and 2 are not surprising because the gradients in
G in Algorithm 2 will have large norms far from z0, thereby allowing them to “overpower” the
noise added, while close to z0 their norms will be smaller and the noise can dominate, causing
increases in the distance to z0 at some timesteps. Of course, z(k)→ z0 asymptotically because
these increases in ‖z(k)− z0‖2 average out over very long periods of time.
The initial error values here were
‖x(0)− x0‖2 = 13.19 and ‖µ(0)− µ0‖2 = 2.169,
2Though the 1-norm is used for other aspects of -differential privacy, we measure distance to z0 using the 2-norm to allow
for meaningful visual comparison of the plots corresponding to -differential privacy in this subsection to those corresponding
to (, δ)-differential privacy in the next subsection.
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Fig. 3. The values of ‖x(k) − x0‖2 for k = 1, . . . , 100, 000 under (, δ)-differential privacy with Algorithm 2. The rapid
descent toward x0 and clear decreasing trend thereafter indicate numerical convergence to x0 in the presence of noise.
And in this run the final error values were
‖x(100, 000)− x0‖2 = 0.2706 and ‖µ(100, 000)− µ0‖2 = 0.2842,
with these values after half of the total runtime being
‖x(50, 000)− x0‖2 = 0.7658 and ‖µ(50, 000)− µ0‖2 = 0.2225.
These values confirm what can be seen visually in Figures 1 and 2: shorter runtimes than
100, 000 timesteps can be used while ending at a reasonable distance from z0 and, in light of the
large variances of some noises present, reasonable numbers of iterations produce an approach
toward z0 that would be useful in many applications.
C. Simulation of (, δ)-differential privacy
In this case the adjacency parameter was chosen to be B > 1. The values  = ln 2 and δ = 0.01
were used for all systems, giving κ(δ, ) = 3.559. Using this privacy policy, the distribution and
variance of each noisy signal were computed and are listed in Table III.
The distribution for wg was N (06×1, 4.073 · 104I6×6) with variance 4.073 · 104. In Table III
we record the distribution of each entry of the matrices wi, i ∈ I , with the understanding that
each wi has i.i.d. entries.
Using this problem formulation, Algorithm 2 was run for 100, 000 iterations and the values of
‖x(k)−x0‖2 and ‖µ(k)−µ0‖2 for 1 ≤ k ≤ 100, 000 are plotted in Figures 3 and 4, respectively.
Noise Distribution Variance
w1 N (0, 101.3) 101.3
w2 N (0, 50.66) 50.66
w3 N (0, 50.66) 50.66
w4 N (0, 50.66) 50.66
w5 N (0, 50.66) 50.66
w6 N (0, 101.3) 101.3
w7 N (0, 50.66) 50.66
w8 N (0, 101.3) 101.3
w9 N (0, 50.66) 50.66
w10 N (0, 50.66) 50.66
TABLE III
NOISY SIGNALS AND THEIR DISTRIBUTIONS FOR (, δ)-DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
In Figures 3 and 4 we see a similar trend to Figures 1 and 2: steady, monotone decrease in the
primal error, and general decreases in the dual error with noticeable oscillations present.
The initial error values for this run were
‖x(0)− x0‖2 = 13.19 and ‖µ(0)− µ0‖2 = 2.169.
The final error values here were
‖x(100, 000)− x0‖2 = 1.1965 and ‖µ(100, 000)− µ0‖2 = 0.7413,
while after half of the total timesteps taken these values were
‖x(50, 000)− x0‖2 = 1.7857 and ‖µ(50, 000)− µ0‖2 = 0.2500,
indicating a rapid initial descent towards z0 and close proximity to it thereafter.
Both simulation examples show a rapid decrease in the distance from z(k) to z0. Such a rapid
decrease lends itself to use of this algorithm in practical applications because it allows for useful
improvements to be made in the value of f in a reasonable runtime while respecting the set
and functional constraints of the problem. The theoretical and simulation results presented here
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Fig. 4. The values of ‖µ(k) − µ0‖2 for k = 1, . . . , 100, 000 under (, δ)-differential privacy with Algorithm 2. The initial
approach toward µ0 and oscillations in distance beyond that point indicate numerical convergence to µ0 when noise is added
for differential privacy.
demonstrate the utility of the iterative Tikhonov regularization, even in the presence of noise
with large variance. This robustness is further supported by the simulation results in [28] and
demonstrates that in a practical setting strong, quantifiable guarantees of privacy can be achieved
while providing useful convergence guarantees in the optimization problem of interest. Critical
to the success of these numerical results is all noise being zero mean, and it is a feature of
differential privacy that zero mean noise is effective at protecting sensitive information.
VI. CONCLUSION
A differentially private optimization algorithm for teams of many agents coordinated by a cen-
tral cloud computer was presented. This problem was treated as a stochastic variational inequality
and solved using a Tikhonov-regularized Goldstein-Levitin-Polyak iteration. Its convergence was
shown for both - and (, δ)-differential privacy and numerical convergence of the algorithm was
shown in simulation, demonstrating the ability to arrive at a collective decision while maintaining
privacy for the users involved in making it.
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